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CASE NOTES
purchaser, the court reflects a desire to place the preservation of the com-
mercial transaction, on which one relies without reasonably being put on
notice of any irregularity, above the policy considerations voiding gambling
contracts. Such protection of the bona fide purchaser could also be accom-
plished if a similar situation should arise in a jurisdiction in which the Uni-
form Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code has become law. Both
statutes contain provisions permitting the acquisition of title by a bona fide
purchaser from one having voidable title"- or, in the proper circumstances,
where the true owner is estopped from asserting the lack of authority in the
possessor to transfer the chattel.' 2 However, before this protection can be
afforded the bona fide purchaser in this situation, the statute concerning the
recovery of gambling losses must treat such gambling contracts as voidable,
or be so construed as by the court as in the principal case.
If perhaps this result seems severe, it should be recalled that it was the
lender who, desirous of facilitating a repayment of his loan, granted per-
mission to the borrower to retain possession of the secured chattel and sell
it. In so doing, a prudent lender should be completely satisfied with both the
honesty and responsibility of his borrower. Otherwise, he runs the risk of
not only losing the chattel when sold in the regular course of business, but
also when such chattel is ultimately acquired by a bona fide purchaser, al-
though there has been an intervening transfer made in violation of such
permission and in settlement of a gambling debt.
JOHN J. DESMOND, III
Conditional Sales—Construction of Insecurity Clause.—Jacksonville
Tractor Co. v. Nativorthy. 1 —A conditional sales contract for the sale of
a farm rake contained an insecurity clause which provided that if the
"seller deems himself insecure or the property in danger of misuse or
confiscation (of which seller shall be the sole judge), . . . seller . . . may
. . . retake possession of said property, with or without process of law . . ."
After a retaking by the seller under the clause, the buyer brought this action
for conversion and obtained a favorable jury verdict in the Civil Court of
Duval County. Defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court's
refusal to grant his motion for a directed verdict was error in the light
of his uncontradicted testimony that he had deemed himself insecure. The
Court of Appeals First District affirmed, holding that the party exercising
construed and declare all such transactions utterly void in the possession of anyone;
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 329, 333; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2:57-3; Va. Code Ann. 1950
§ 11-4; while others make exceptions in the case of negotiable instruments in the hands
of a holder in due course or bona fide purchasers; Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-553 (1948);
Ga. Code of 1933 § 20-505.
11 USA § 24; UCC 2-403(1).
12 USA § 23; UCC §§ 2-403(2) & (3).
1 114 So. 2d 463 (Fla. Ct. App. 1st D. 1959).
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his right under the clause has the burden of demonstrating that he was
confronted with such circumstances as would lead a reasonable and prudent
man in his position to deem himself insecure. Thus it was proper for the
trial court to hold the defendant to this objective standard and submit to
the jury the question of whether under all the circumstances he could reason-
ably have believed that his debt was in danger.
Lacking Florida precedent for the construction of such a clause in a
conditional sales contract, the Court found support for its decision in a
Mississippi case which set forth the three well-defined approaches to such
a provision.2
 These constructions are: (1) that of the principal case whiCh
demands of the seller that he act in good faith and be able to demonstrate
that he was reasonable in concluding that his debt was insecure, (2) that
which demands of the seller only that he act in good faith, and (3) that
which stipulates that the debt must have been actually in a precarious
condition.3
 Most courts have deprived the seller of the advantage that
would be his under a literal construction of the insecurity clause, and have
used the objective standard of the Florida Court'
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act contains no language pertinent
to the insecurity clause. But it is certain that under § 1-208 of the Uniform
Commercial Code the court would have come to an opposite conclusion and
sustained the motion for a directed verdict because of plaintiff buyer's
failure to establish a lack of good faith on the part of the defendant seller.
The Code construction of the insecurity clause contained in § 1-208 differs
from that of the principal case both in establishing the standard which
seller must meet and in allocating the burden of proof.° It adopts the
view that the seller is the sole judge of the facts, and that as long as he
acts in good faith there is no requirement that there be reasonable grounds
for his deeming himself insecure. Furthermore, the Code places the burden
of demonstrating seller's lack of the requisite good faith upon the buyer.°
The good faith requisite has some analogy to cases in which promises
conditional on satisfaction have been construed to require at least an honest
dissatisfaction.? The seller: may be unreasonable in deeming himself insecure
but as long as he has been honest in fact in -his conduct then he has acted
within his rights .° It is to be noted, however, that under the Code view
2
 Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, I So. 2d 776 (1941).
3 Ibid. at 777.
4
 Rochon v. Pacific Coast Mortg. Co., 111 Cal. App. 298, 295 Pac. 364 (2d Dist.
1931).
5
 UCC § 1-208. "Option to Accelerate at Will. A term providing that one party
or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral
or additional collateral at will' or when he deems himself insecure' or in words of
similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only
if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.




 Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12A § 1-208. Restatement, Contracts § 263 (1932).
8




the question of reasonableness has not become irrelevant, since an extreme
unreasonableness on the part of the seller may indicate his lack of good
faith.
The Code provision has the effect of holding the parties to the language
of their contract without imposing upon the buyer a seller's arbitrary
right to retake possession. It seems certain that if an insecurity clause
is so phrased as to confer such an arbitrary right it will be either stricken
under § 2-302 as unconscionable or so limited as to avoid an unconscionable
result.9
 If, however, no unconscionable result would be effectuated, the
buyer may nevertheless find protection under § 1-208. That Section imposes
a duty upon the seller to use good faith in exercising his right under
an insecurity clause. This good faith standard to which the seller is held
would not constitute a deviation in most instances. But if the parties intended
that the seller could act without any obligation of good faith then § 1-208
imposes only a minimum alteration of the contract term and thereby,
in large, allows the parties to contract as they choose. It has been suggested
that any further protection for the debtor in such transactions as retail
installment purchases should be secured by legislation enacted separately
from the Code.I° The Code construction of the insecurity clause seems
more logical and just than that used by the principal case which in effect
varies the contract term to the liking of the court without sufficient
justification.
WILLIAM M. BULGER
Contracts—Accord and Satisfaction—Enforcement of Executory Ac-
cord by Creditor upon Breach by Debtor.—Ohlson v. Steinhauser. 1—
Plaintiff filed an action for breach of promise. Subsequently, by way of
compromise and settlement and discharge of this cause of action, defendant
agreed to pay and plaintiff agreed to accept $6000. Thereafter, the defendant
refused to pay. The plaintiff then brought the present suit to obtain payment
of the $6000. The defendant contended the agreement sued upon was an
accord and satisfaction and not binding and enforceable until the satisfaction
called for was paid, prior to which time either party could revoke. The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Oregon affirmed. Held: the defendant's failure to pay the satisfaction
agreed upon could only bar the defendant from pleading the compromise
agreement if the plaintiff had brought suit on the original cause of action.
Such failure cannot be claimed as a defense to the present action.
9 UCC fi 2-302. "Unconscionable Contracts Clause. (1) If the court as a matter
of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
10 See notes to UCC §§ 9-102, 9-203 (1957 ed.).
1 346 P.2d 87 (Ore. Sp. Ct. 1959).
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